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A novel approach to malware classification is introduced based
on analysis of instruction traces that are collected dynamically from
the program in question. The method has been implemented online
in a sandbox environment (i.e., a security mechanism for separating
running programs) at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and is in-
tended for eventual host-based use, provided the issue of sampling
the instructions executed by a given process without disruption to
the user can be satisfactorily addressed. The procedure represents an
instruction trace with a Markov chain structure in which the transi-
tion matrix, P, has rows modeled as Dirichlet vectors. The malware
class (malicious or benign) is modeled using a flexible spline logistic
regression model with variable selection on the elements of P, which
are observed with error. The utility of the method is illustrated on
a sample of traces from malware and nonmalware programs, and the
results are compared to other leading detection schemes (both sig-
nature and classification based). This article also has supplementary
materials available online.
1. Introduction. Malware (short for malicious software) is a term used
to describe a variety of forms of hostile, intrusive or annoying software or
program code. It was recently estimated that 30% of computers operating in
the US are infected with some form of malware [PandaLabs (2012)]. More
than 286 million unique variants of malware were detected in 2010 alone
[Symantec (2011)], and it is widely believed that the release rate of mali-
cious software is now far exceeding that of legitimate software applications
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[Symantec (2008)]. A large majority of the new malware is created through
simple modifications to existing malicious programs or by using code obfus-
cation techniques such as a packer [Royal et al. (2006)]. A packer compresses
a program much the same way a compressor like Pkzip does, then attaches
its own decryption/loading stub which “unpacks” the program before re-
suming execution normally at the program’s original entry point (OEP).
1.1. Review of malware detection. Malicious software is growing at such
a rate that commercial antivirus vendors (AV) are not able to adequately
keep up with new variants. There are two methods for antivirus scanners
to implement their technology. The first is via a static signature scanning
method, which uses a sequence of known bytes in a program and tests for
the existence of this sequence. The second method of detection is to use
generic or heuristic detection technologies. Unfortunately, even though most
of the new malware is very similar to known malware, it will often not be
detected by signature-based antivirus programs [Christodorescu and Jha
(2003), Perdisci et al. (2006)] until the malware signature eventually works
its way into the database, which can take weeks or even longer. Further,
in a recent study [Antivirus Comparatives (2011)], detection of new mal-
ware threats (i.e., those not yet in the signature database) was found to be
substantially less than the ideals touted by AV company product literature.
Because of the susceptibility to new malware, classification procedures
based on statistical and machine learning techniques have been developed
to classify new programs. These methods have generally revolved around n-
gram analysis of the static binary or dynamic trace of the malicious program
[Reddy and Pujari (2006), Reddy, Dash and Pujari (2006), Stolfo, Wang and
Li (2007), Dai, Guha and Lee (2009)], and some very promising results have
come from a Markov chain representation of the program trace [Anderson
et al. (2011)].
The data sources used to classify programs include binary files [Kolter and
Maloof (2006), Reddy, Dash and Pujari (2006)], binary disassembled files [Bi-
lar (2007), Shankarapani et al. (2010)], dynamic system call traces [Bayer
et al. (2006), Hofmeyr, Forrest and Somayaji (1998), Rieck et al. (2011)] and,
most recently, dynamic instruction traces [Anderson et al. (2011), Dai, Guha
and Lee (2009)]. Although some success has been achieved by using disas-
sembled files, this cannot always be done, particularly if the program uses
an unknown packer, and therefore, this approach has similar shortcomings
to the signature-based methods.
Here a similar path is taken to that in Anderson et al. (2011) where they
use the dynamic trace from many samples of malware and benign programs
to train a classifier. A dynamic trace is a record of the sequence of instruc-
tions executed by the program as it is actually running. Dynamic traces can
provide much more information about the true functionality of a program
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than the static binary, since the instructions appear in exactly the order in
which they are executed during operation. The drawback to dynamic traces
is that they are difficult to collect for two reasons: (i) the program must be
run in a safe environment and (ii) malware often has self-protection mecha-
nisms designed to guard against being watched by a dynamic trace collection
tool, and care must be taken to ensure the program is running as it would
under normal circumstances.
For this paper a modified version of the Ether malware analysis framework
[Dinaburg et al. (2008)] was used to perform the data collection. Ether is a
set of extensions on top of the Xen virtual machine. Ether uses a tactic of
zero modification to be able to track and analyze a running system. Zero
modification preserves the sterility of the infected system, and limits the
methods that malware authors can use to detect if their malware is being
analyzed. Increasing the complexity of detection makes for a much more
robust analysis system.
Collecting dynamic traces can be slow due to all of the built-in func-
tionality of Ether to safeguard against a process altering its behavior while
being watched. Collection of traces can also be performed with Intel’s Pin
tool [Luk et al. (2005), Skaletsky et al. (2010)], which is faster and more
stable than Ether. However, there is some concern that Pin is more easily
detected by the program being monitored. In either case, it is an engineer-
ing hurdle to develop a software/hardware solution that would be efficient
enough to collect traces on a host without disruption to the user. This prob-
lem is being investigated, however, the current implementation is sufficient
for application on an enterprise network using a sandbox environment (i.e.,
the program is passed along to the user that requested it, while being run
on a separate machine devoted to analysis) [Goldberg et al. (1996)]. There
are several commercial sandbox tools available (e.g., FireEye, CW Sandbox,
Norman Sandbox, Malwr, Anubis, . . . ) that are used by many institutions
in a similar manner, for example.
The proposed methodology (using Pin for trace extraction) has been in-
serted into this process at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and now
allows for a more robust approach to analyzing new threats as they arrive at
the network perimeter. To be clear, the extensive results and comparisons
presented in this paper used the Ether tool for trace collection. However,
Intel’s Pin tool was adopted for trace extraction to conduct model training
and classification in the actual implementation in LANL’s sandbox since it
was much more stable and therefore better for use in an automated environ-
ment. While this sandbox implementation allows the possibility of infection
on an individual user’s machine, it is still a major advantage to know that a
machine has been infected with malware so that the appropriate action can
be taken. For example, it is far better to clean up a few machines and label
that file as malware instantly for other machines (i.e., blacklist it forever
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using signature-based tools) than the alternative of not knowing about the
infection until some time much later.
1.2. Goals of this work. The two main goals of this work are then to
(i) classify malware with high accuracy for a fixed false discovery rate (e.g.,
0.001) and (ii) provide an online classification scheme that can determine
when enough trace data has been collected to make a decision.
As mentioned previously, this work builds upon that of Anderson et al.
(2011), but is different in several important ways. Most notably, goal (ii)
is tackled here, but also goal (i) is achieved in a quite different manner
through categorization of instructions and a different classification proce-
dure, as described in Section 3. In order to accomplish (i), we propose a lo-
gistic regression framework using penalized splines. Estimation of the large
number of model parameters is performed with a Relaxed Adaptive Elas-
tic Net procedure, which is a combination of ideas from the Relaxed Lasso
[Meinshausen (2007)], Adaptive Lasso [Zou (2006)] and the Elastic Net [Zou
and Hastie (2005)]. To accomplish (ii), we allow the regression model to
have measurement error in the predictors in order to account for the un-
certainty in a dynamic trace with a small number of instructions. Initial
results indicate the potential for this approach to provide some excellent
and much needed protection against new malware threats to complement
the traditional signature-based approach.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic
trace data and how it will be used in the regression model. In Section 3 the
underlying classification model and estimation methodology are presented.
The classification results on five minute dynamic traces are presented in
Section 4. Finally, an illustration of how the method could be applied in
practice in an online classification analysis is provided in Section 5. Section 6
concludes the paper. The supplementary document to this paper [Storlie
et al. (2014)], available online, also presents some preliminary work on the
clustering of malware.
2. Dynamic trace data. As mentioned previously, a modified version of
the Ether malware analysis framework [Dinaburg et al. (2008)] was used to
collect the dynamic trace data. A dynamic trace is the sequence of processor
instructions called during the execution of a program. This is in contrast to
a disassembled binary static trace which is the order of instructions as they
appear in the binary file. The dynamic trace is generally believed to be
a more robust measure of the program’s behavior since code packers can
obfuscate functionality from analysis of static traces. Other data can be
incorporated as well (e.g., presence of a packer, system calls, file name and
location, static trace, . . . ). The framework laid out in Section 3 allows for
as many data sources or features as one may wish to include.
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In order to make efficient use of the dynamic trace, it is helpful to think
of the instruction sequence as a Markov chain. This representation of the
sequence has been shown to have better explanatory power than related n-
gram methods [Anderson et al. (2011), Shafiq, Khayam and Farooq (2008)].
To this end, the instruction sequence is converted into a transition matrix
Z, where
Zjk = number of direct transitions from instruction j to instruction k.
Estimated transition probabilities Pˆ are obtained from counts Z, where
Pjk =Pr{next instruction is k | current instruction is j}.
The elements of Pˆ are then used as predictors to classify malicious behavior.
This entire procedure is described in more detail in Section 3. The Zjk
are 2-grams, while the estimated Pjk are essentially a scaled version of the
2-grams, that is, the relative frequency of going from state j to state k
given that the process is now in state j. These quantities (Zjk and Pjk) are
usually substantially different in this case, since not all states are visited with
similar frequencies. Anderson et al. (2011) used estimated Pjk from dynamic
traces (with the state space consisting of Intel instructions observed in the
sample) as features in a support vector machine. They found that using
the Pjk provided far better classification results for malware than using 2-
grams (or n-grams in general). This is likely due to the fact that sometimes
informative transitions j→ k may occur from a state j that is rarely visited
by a particular program, but when it is visited, it tends to produce the j→ k
transition prominently. Such situations will be measured very differently
with Pjk versus Zjk.
There are hundreds of commonly used instructions in the Intel instruc-
tion set, and thousands of distinct instructions overall. A several thousand
by several thousand matrix of transitions, resulting in millions of predic-
tors, would make estimation difficult. More importantly, many instructions
perform the same or similar tasks (e.g., “add” and “subtract”). Grouping
such instructions together in a reasonable way not only produces a faster
method but also provides better explanatory power versus using all distinct
Intel instructions in our experience. This is also illustrated via classification
performance in Section 4.
Through collaboration with code writers familiar with assembly language,
we have developed four categorizations of the Intel instructions, ranging from
coarse groupings to more fine:
• Categorization 1 (8 classes → 64 predictors):
math, logic, priv, branch, memory, stack, nop, other
• Categorization 2 (56 classes → 3136 predictors):
asc, add, and, priv, bit, call, math other, movc, cmp, dcl, . . .
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Fig. 1. Markov chain transition probability representation of a dynamic instruction trace:
(left) the first several lines from a dynamic trace output (i.e., instruction and location
acted on in memory, which is not used), (right) a conceptual conversion of the instruction
sequence into categorization 1 transition probabilities.
• Categorization 3 (86 classes → 7396 predictors):
Python Library “pydasm” categories for Intel instructions
• Categorization 4 (122 classes → 14,884 predictors):
pydasm categories for instructions with rep instruction-x given its own
class distinct from instruction-x.
Figure 1 displays a conceptualization of the Markov chain transition prob-
ability representation of a dynamic instruction trace. The graph on the right
has eight nodes corresponding to the eight categories of categorization 1,
where the edges correspond to transition probabilities from one instruction
category to the next for the given program. The location (i.e., address) that
each instruction acted on in memory is not used in this analysis, since these
locations are not consistent from one execution of the program to another.
The data set used contains dynamic traces from 18,942 malicious and
3046 benign programs, respectively, for a total of 21,988 observations. The
malicious sample was obtained via a random sample of programs from the
website http://www.offensivecomputing.net/, which is a repository that
collects malware instances in cooperation with several institutions. Malware
samples are acquired by the Offensive Computing Website through user
contributions, capture via mwcollectors and other honeypots (i.e., traps set
up on a network for the purpose of collecting malware or other information
about possible network attacks), discovery on compromised systems, and
sharing with various institutions. Admittedly, this is not a truly random
sample from the population of all malicious programs that a given network
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may see, but it is one of the largest publicly available malware collections
on the Internet [Quist (2012)].
Obtaining a large sample of “known to be clean” or benign programs is
more difficult. If a program is just not deemed to be malware by AV, it
should not be given a definite “clean bill of health,” as will be clear from
the results of Section 4. Hence, to obtain a large sample of benign programs,
a collection was gathered of many programs that were running on LANL
systems during 2012. If these programs passed through a suite of 25 AV
engines as “clean,” then they were treated as benign for this paper. There is
a far lower rate of malware on LANL systems then in the “wild.” Therefore,
if a program that was on a LANL system also passes through the various
AV programs as clean, it is probably safe to deem it benign.
Each of the observations was obtained from a 5 minute run of the program.
Originally there were 19,156 malicious and 3157 benign programs, but any
program with less than 2000 instructions executed during the five minutes
was removed from the data set. The rationale behind this was that some
benign processes remain fairly idle, waiting for user interaction. Since such
programs produce very short traces and are not representative of the kind
of programs that require scanning, it was decided to remove them from the
training set. The data set used in this analysis (dynamic trace files obtained
via Ether) is available upon request.
3. A statistical model for malware classification. Elements of an esti-
mated probability transition matrix for the dynamic trace of each program
Pˆ are used as predictors to classify a program as malicious or benign. Two
main goals for the classification model are to (i) screen out most predictors
to improve performance and allow certain transitions to demonstrate their
importance to classification, and (ii) explicitly account for uncertainty in Pˆ
for online classification purposes because this uncertainty will have a large
impact on the decision until a sufficiently long trace is obtained.
3.1. Logistic spline regression model. For a given categorization (from
the four categorizations given in Section 2) with c instruction categories, let
Zi be the transition counts between instruction categories for the ith ob-
servation (an observation Zi is made once on each program). Let Bi be the
indicator of maliciousness, that is, Bi = 1 if the ith observation is malicious
and Bi = 0 otherwise. For the initial model fit discussion in this section, we
take Pi to be fixed at an estimated value Pˆi. The training set has observa-
tions where the traces are long enough so that there is very little variability
in Pˆi. In the results of Section 4 we specifically take Pˆi to be the poste-
rior mean [i.e., E(Pi | Zi)], assuming a symmetric Dirichlet(ν) prior for each
row of Pi (i.e., an independent Dirichlet distribution with parameter vector
[ν, ν, . . . , ν] was assumed for each row of Pi). In the analysis presented in
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this paper ν = 0.1 was used. However, in Section 5 the assumption of a fixed
known Pi (equal to Pˆi) is relaxed and a simple approach is described to
account for the uncertainty inherent in Pi when making decisions based on
shorter traces.
The actual predictors used to model the Bi are
xi = [logit(Pˆi,1,1), logit(Pˆi,1,2), . . . , logit(Pˆi,c,c−1), logit(Pˆi,c,c)]
′(1)
for i= 1, . . . , n, where Pˆi,j,k is the (j, k)th entry of the Pˆi matrix, and each
component of the xi is scaled to have sample mean 0 and sample variance
1, across i = 1, . . . , n. The scaling of the predictors to a comparable range
is a standard practice for penalized regression methods [Tibshirani (1996),
Zou and Hastie (2005)]. We then use the model
logit[Pr(B = 1)] = fβ(x) = β0 +
c2∑
s=1
K+1∑
l=1
βs,lφs,l(xs),(2)
where the basis functions φs,1, . . . , φs,K+1 form a linear spline with K knots
at equally spaced quantiles of xs, s = 1, . . . , c
2 (and c2 is the number of
elements in the Pˆ matrix). That is, φs,1(xs) = xs and
φs,l(xs) = |xs − ξs,l|+ for l= 2, . . . ,K +1,
where ξs,l is the (l − 1)th knot for the sth predictor, and |x|+ = x if x > 0
and 0 otherwise.
Pairwise products of the φs,l(x) can also be included to create a two-way
interaction spline for f(x). A compromise which is more flexible than the
additive model in (2), but not as cumbersome as the full two-way interaction
spline, is to use a model which includes multiplicative interaction terms, that
is,
fβ(x) = β0 +
c2∑
s=1
K+1∑
l=1
βs,s,lφs,s,k(xs) +
c2−1∑
s=1
c2∑
t=s+1
K+1∑
l=1
βs,t,lφs,t,l(xsxt),(3)
where φs,t,1, . . . , φs,t,K+1 form a linear spline with K knots at equally spaced
quantiles of xsxt for s 6= t (and at equally spaced quantiles of xs for s= t).
The model in (3) with K = 5 is ultimately the route taken for implemen-
tation of the detection scheme on our network. This model has potentially
a very large number of parameters in this application [∼30 million β’s for
the interaction model in (3) when using categorization 2]. Thus, an efficient
sparse estimation procedure is necessary and is described next in Section 3.2.
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3.2. Relaxed Adaptive Elastic Net estimation. In order to estimate the
large number of parameters in (3), a combination of the Elastic Net [Zou
and Hastie (2005)], Relaxed Lasso [Meinshausen (2007)] and Adaptive Lasso
[Zou (2006)] procedures was used. The Elastic Net is efficient and useful
for extremely high-dimensional predictor problems p≫ n. This is in part
because it can ignore many unimportant predictors (i.e., it sets many of the
βs,t,l ≡ 0). The Elastic Net, Relaxed Lasso and Adaptive Lasso procedures
are reviewed below, then generalized for use in this application.
The data likelihood is
L(β;B) =
n∏
i=1
[logit−1(fβ(xi))]
IBi=1 [1− logit−1(fβ(xi))]
IBi=0 ,
where B= [B1,B2, . . . ,Bn]
t. The Elastic Net estimator is a combination of
ridge regression and Lasso [Tibshirani (1996)], that is, it seeks the β that
minimizes
logL(β;B) + λ
{
ρ
c2∑
s=1
c2∑
t=s
K+1∑
l=1
β2s,t,l + (1− ρ)
c2∑
s=1
c2∑
t=s
K+1∑
l=1
|βs,t,l|
}
(4)
for given tuning parameters λ > 0 and ρ ∈ [0,1] which are typically chosen
via m-fold cross-validation (CV). For the linear spline model of (3), the
penalty on β2s,t,l and |βs,t,l| corresponds to a penalty on the overall trend and
the change in slope at the knots (i.e., encourages “smoothness”). Another
benefit to the Elastic Net is that fits for many values of λ are obtained at
the computational cost of a single least squares fit [i.e., O(p2)] via the Least
Angle Regression (LARS) algorithm [Efron et al. (2004)].
The Relaxed Lasso and Adaptive Lasso both emerged as procedures devel-
oped to counteract the over-shrinking that occurs to the nonzero coefficients
when using the Lasso procedure in high dimensions. The Relaxed Lasso can
be thought of as a two-stage procedure, where the Lasso procedure (i.e., the
Elastic Net estimator with ρ= 0) is applied with λ= λ1, then the Lasso is
applied again to only the nonzero coefficients with λ= λ2, where typically
λ1 >λ2.
The Adaptive Lasso is also a two-stage procedure where an initial estimate
of βs,t,l is obtained via unregularized maximum likelihood estimates or via
ridge regression (if p > n). In the second step, the Lasso is applied with a
penalty that has each term weighted by the reciprocal of the initial estimates,
β˜s,t,l.
This motivates the following three-step approach taken to estimate the
coefficients of the logistic spline model in (3):
Algorithm 1: Estimation procedure.
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Step 1: Screen the predictors xs for importance (i.e., conduct variable
selection) using a linear logistic model
logit[Pr(B = 1)] = f1(x) = α0 +
∑
s
αsxs,
with α estimated via Elastic Net in (4) with λ= λ1 and ρ= 0.5.
Step 2: Use active predictors (i.e., those xs with αs 6= 0) to fit the interac-
tion spline model of (3) via the Elastic Net with λ= λ2 and ρ= 0.5. Denote
the estimated coefficients from step 2 as β˜s,t,l.
Step 3: Fit the interaction spline model of (3) via the Adaptive Elastic
Net with λ= λ3 and ρ= ρ3. That is, βˆ is given by the minimizer of
logL(β;B)+λ3
{
ρ3
c2∑
s=1
c2∑
t=s
K+1∑
l=1
(
βs,t,l
β˜s,t,l
)2
+(1−ρ3)
c2∑
s=1
c2∑
t=s
K+1∑
l=1
∣∣∣∣βs,t,l
β˜s,t,l
∣∣∣∣
}
.
(5)
The tuning parameters λ1, λ2, λ3 and ρ3 need to be chosen via CV.
However, these parameters are tuned individually within their respective
steps of the fitting algorithm (i.e., tune λ1 in step 1, then tune λ2 in step 2,
then tune λ3 and ρ3 in step 3). That is, they are not tuned to find a global
optimum in the four-dimensional space. As mentioned above, tuning of λ
comes at no additional cost in the LARS algorithm. So the only loop needed
is in step 3 of the algorithm to tune ρ3. Additionally, the implementation
of the LARS algorithm via the R package glmnet allows a specification
of the maximum number of nonzero coefficients to ever be included into
the model. This max was set to 20,000 in each step of Algorithm 1 in our
implementation.
On the surface it may seem excessive to combine these three concepts, but
the extremely high dimensionality of the model in (3) demands this aggres-
sive approach. There are over 9 million parameters if using categorization
2, over 200 million predictors if using categorization 4. The initial out-of-
sample classification results using just one of these procedures alone were
far inferior to those obtained with combined approach. For example, over-
all 10-fold CV classification rates of ∼94% were achieved with the Elastic
Net, Adaptive Lasso and Relaxed Lasso, respectively, when used alone to fit
the model in (3), whereas overall 10-fold CV accuracies achieved using the
combined method above are ∼98%, as shown in Section 4. One could also
use another sparse estimation routine in place of Elastic Net in Algorithm
1. In fact, the results of using the Maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate
discussed in Taddy (2013) are also provided in Section 4.
MALWARE DETECTION WITH DYNAMIC TRACES 11
3.3. Prior correction for sample bias. Prior correction [Manski and Ler-
man (1977), Prentice and Pyke (1979)] involves computing the usual logistic
regression fit and correcting the estimates based on prior information about
the proportion of malware in the population of interest pi1 and the observed
proportion of malware in the sample (or sampling probability), B¯. Knowl-
edge of pi1 can come from some prior knowledge, such as expert elicitation
or previous data. King and Zeng (2001) point out that, provided the esti-
mates of the regression coefficients [i.e., βs,t,l, j < k, l = 1, . . . ,M in (5)] are
consistent, the following corrected estimate is consistent for β0:
β˜0 = βˆ0 − log
(
1− pi1
pi1
B¯
1− B¯
)
.(6)
Prior correction will have no effect on the classification accuracy results
discussed in Section 4, since it is just a monotonic transformation, so there
will be an equivalent threshold to produce the same classification either way.
However, it can be useful in practice to have the estimated probability of
maliciousness for a given program provide a measure of belief of the mali-
ciousness of the program on a scale that incorporates the prior probability
that the code is malicious. That is, if pi1 can somehow be specified for the
given network on which the program will be executed, then prior correction
in (6) can be useful.
4. Classification results. Let P̂r(B = 1 | x) be given by (3) with βs,t,l
replaced by their respective estimates βˆs,t,l. The ith observation is classified
as malicious if P̂r(B = 1 | xi)> τ for some threshold τ which can be selected
to produce an acceptable false discovery rate (FDR).
4.1. Out of sample accuracy. The classification accuracy of the proposed
method is first examined on the various categorizations. The 10-fold CV
overall accuracy results for the four different categorizations are provided in
Table 1. The overall accuracy is defined as the number of correct classifi-
cations divided by the number of programs. Categorizations 2, 3 and 4 are
generally not much different from each other, but they all perform far bet-
ter than categorization 1. In the remainder of the results the categorization
2 is used, since it provides the most parsimonious model among the best
performing covariate sets.
The logistic spline regression with Relaxed Adaptive Elastic Net estima-
tion EN Inter Spline is compared to various other methods (with all meth-
ods using categorization 2 unless explicitly stated otherwise) in Table 2. The
data set was partitioned into the same 10 sets to produce the 10-fold CV
results for all methods. The entire estimation routine (including scaling the
covariates and parameter tuning) was conducted on each of the ten training
sets, then predictions on the respective test sets were obtained.
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Table 1
Overall out-of-sample accuracy calculated via 10-fold CV by category using logistic
interaction spline regression with Relaxed Adaptive Elastic Net estimation. The standard
error of the respective accuracy estimates are provided in parentheses
Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4
0.923 (0.009) 0.976 (0.004) 0.971 (0.003) 0.971 (0.003)
The competing methods are (i) MAP Inter Spline—using the MAP esti-
mate of Taddy (2013) from the R-package textir in place of the elastic net
throughout Algorithm 1, (ii) EN Linear+Int—using a linear model with
interaction instead of the interaction spline in Algorithm 1, (iii) EN Add
Spline—using an additive spline instead of the interaction spline in Algo-
rithm 1, (iv) EN Linear—linear logistic regression estimated with Elastic
Net (i.e., step 1 of Algorithm 1), (v) MDA—the mixture discriminant anal-
ysis (MDA) routine of Hastie and Tibshirani (1996) (using the R package
mda) using two components on the set of covariates with nonzero coefficients
from the linear logistic regression elastic net, (vi) SVM—a support vec-
tor machine using a Gaussian kernel provided by the R package kernlab,
(vii) SVM (No Cat)—a support vector machine using a Gaussian kernel and
using a distinct category for each unique instruction [i.e., the approach of
Anderson et al. (2011) implemented with the author’s C code], and (viii)
Antivirus 1–7—seven leading signature-based antivirus programs with all
of their most recent updates. The predictor screening used in conjunction
with the MDA method is essential in this case in order to avoid the nu-
merical issues with the procedure that occurred when using all predictors.
The number of mixture components (two) was chosen to produce the best
10-fold CV accuracy.
The names of the leading antivirus programs are not provided due to le-
gal concerns. It is important to recognize that these AV software packages
are using signatures (i.e., blacklists) and whitelists as well as heuristics to
determine if a program is malicious. The other (i.e., classification-based)
methods in the table are not using signatures, hence, a direct comparison
to the AV results is not possible. In particular, the results of the classifica-
tion approaches would improve substantially if signatures were to be used
to ensure correct classification for some of the programs in the data set. It
is important to understand that the goal of the classification-based meth-
ods is not to replace signature-based detection, but rather to complement
signature-based methods by providing protection from new threats. Even
without the use of signatures, the interaction spline logistic method is com-
petitive with signature-based methods and would be a promising addition
to AV software. The EN Linear+Int method is also competitive in terms of
MALWARE DETECTION WITH DYNAMIC TRACES 13
Table 2
Comparison of classification results using various methods. All methods use
categorization 2 with the exception of SVM (No Cat), which assumes each unique
instruction is its own unique category. All methods had results calculated via 10-fold CV
(same 10 folds were used for each method)
Malware detection accuracy1
Compute
time (min)
Detection method
Overall
accuracy 1% FDR2 0.1% FDR3 ∼0% FDR4 Train5 Predict6
EN Inter Spline 0.976 0.817 0.692 934 0.291
MAP Inter Spline 0.969 0.807 0.594 265 0.282
SVM 0.963 0.597 0.333 231 0.328
EN Linear+Int 0.961 0.679 0.373 90 0.013
EN Add Spline 0.952 0.646 0.342 483 0.187
EN Linear 0.944 0.564 0.272 32 0.002
SVM (No Cat) 0.936 0.420 0.315 447 0.929
MDA 0.926 0.252 0.115 33 0.001
Antivirus 1 0.838 0.812
Antivirus 2 0.831 0.804
Antivirus 3 0.825 0.797
Antivirus 4 0.805 0.774
Antivirus 5 0.790 0.756
Antivirus 6 0.619 0.558
Antivirus 7 0.287 0.172
1The number of correct malware classifications divided by the number of malware obser-
vations.
230 out of 3046 benign programs incorrectly considered malicious.
3Three out of 3046 benign programs incorrectly considered malicious.
4There are some false positives from signature-based detection methods due to fuzzy
matching heuristics (Antivirus 1 and Antivirus 2 had two and one false detections, re-
spectively, in this data set, e.g.), but the exact FDR for these signature-based methods is
unknown.
5Time in minutes to conduct the estimation of the model including parameter tuning (via
10-fold CV) for one of the ten training sets (i.e., using ∼20,000 observations) once the
traces have been collected and parsed.
6Time in minutes to conduct the classification of all of the programs in one of the ten test
sets (i.e., ∼2200 programs) once the traces have been collected and parsed.
accuracy and at a small fraction of the computational cost for training and
prediction.
Another competing method that would ideally be used in this compari-
son is the posterior mean of the probability of maliciousness (as opposed to
the MAP), as discussed in Gramacy and Polson (2012) and provided by the
R package reglogit. In fact, when assuming a Bayesian logistic regression
model, thresholding on the posterior mean would be Bayes optimal. In this
particular problem, though, the covariate space was too large for this ap-
proach to be practical. However, the MAP and posterior mean will be nearly
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Fig. 2. ROC curves for the methods in Table 2.
identical for a large enough sample. In this paper, for example, we have a
sample of over 20,000 and, in practice, this number is growing everyday. In
an effort to compare MAP to posterior mean for a large sample, we ran with
both approaches on the logistic regression model with linear terms using cat-
egorization 1. This test case was chosen because it posed no computational
issues. The MAP and posterior mean provided nearly identical results, for
example, out-of-sample accuracies were 0.911 and 0.908, respectively. This
provides some assurance that the MAP will perform similarly to the poste-
rior mean here, however, it is hard to know for certain how large of a sample
is needed for this difference to become negligible for the interaction splines
model on categorization 2.
Figure 2 displays the ROC curves for the various competing methods in
Table 2. The antivirus programs are excluded since there is no thresholding
parameter with which to vary the false positive rate. It is clear from Ta-
ble 2 and Figure 2 that the interaction spline logistic model with Relaxed
Adaptive Elastic Net estimation or Relaxed Adaptive MAP estimation are
superior to the other methods for this classification problem. In particular,
the Interaction Spline EN procedure has an estimated out-of-sample overall
error rate of only 0.024 (accuracy of 97.6%) and still maintains a high degree
of malware identification accuracy (69.2%) when held to a very small (0.1%)
false positive rate. When implementing this procedure in practice, it would
be wise to actually tune the estimation procedure not to necessarily obtain
the best overall accuracy as was done here, but rather to specifically obtain
high accuracy at identifying malware for a small false positive rate.
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5. Online detection. The predictors used in the logit spline model of
Section 3 are the elements of the probability transition matrix P, which can
only be observed (i.e., estimated) with error. This measurement error can
be substantial for a dynamic trace with only a small number of instructions.
For online classification, it is essential to account for this measurement error
and its effect on the probability of maliciousness. Of particular importance
is determining how long of an instruction trace is needed before a decision
can be made.
To tackle this issue, each row of P is further modeled as a symmetric
Dirichlet(ν) vector a priori, with each row assumed independent. The Dirich-
let distribution is a conjugate prior for P in a Markov chain model. With
this assumption, and a trace T1:m with m instructions observed thus far,
the probability of being Malicious, Pr(B = 1) = logit−1(fˆ(P)), has inherent
variability (due to the uncertainty in P) that decreases as m increases (i.e.,
as a longer instruction trace is obtained). If a given process produces a trace
T1:m, the distribution of Pr(B = 1) can be simulated by generating draws
from the posterior of P to produce uncertainty bands and a posterior mean
estimate E[Pr(B = 1) | T1:m].
This can be thought of as an empirical Bayes approach, as f is replaced
with an estimate fˆ , while only the uncertainty in P is recognized. This
is a good compromise, since there is a large sample available to construct
the classification model, and the uncertainty in Pr(B = 1) is dominated by
uncertainty in P early on in the trace. Ideally, a fully Bayesian version of
this procedure could be implemented, accounting for the “measurement”
error even in the logistic regression estimation process. However, this was
attempted and proved to be computationally infeasible for this problem.
Figure 3 demonstrates the empirical Bayes approach on the first malicious
(a) Dynamic trace from a malicious program (b) Dynamic trace from a benign program
Fig. 3. Posterior mean of the probability of malware given the instruction sequence for
a malicious sample (a) and benign sample (b), respectively, as a function of number of
instructions (95% CI reflecting uncertainty in red).
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Fig. 4. Computation time breakdown for analysis of a particular new program that gen-
erated ∼3.5× 106 instructions in a 5 minute trace. CIs calculated from a sample of 1000
posterior draws of P.
and benign programs in the sample, respectively, using a prior correction of
pi1 = 0.01. There is a lot of uncertainty in either case initially, until about
10,000 instructions are collected (typically this takes a few seconds of run-
time or less). By about 30,000 instructions the Pr(B = 1) for the malicious
and benign processes are tightly distributed near one and zero, respectively.
A possible implementation for online decision making could be to classify
as malicious (or benign) according to Pr(B = 1)> τ (for some threshold τ
that admits a tolerable number of alarms per day) once the 95% credible
interval (CI) is narrow enough (e.g., <0.1).
Figure 4 provides a breakdown of the computational time needed for each
piece of the analysis of a new program. It is clear that most of the time is
spent on the extraction of the trace itself. This five minutes, however, can
be significantly shortened in many cases using the CI approach discussed
above. With this current computational burden, this approach is currently
only suitable for use on a network sandbox (i.e., running on a server) as it
is passed along to the host machine. A trace extraction in-line on the host
could be feasible via a different software or hardware solution, however, and
is currently being investigated further.
Once a file is suspected of being malicious, it is often necessary to re-
verse engineer (RE) the program to determine its functionality and origin
in order to know how to respond and/or how to better prevent future infec-
tions into the computer network. The reverse engineering process is fairly
sophisticated, requiring many hours of effort from a highly trained individ-
ual. Some preliminary work has been done to cluster malware instances into
homogeneous groups to speed up the RE process. This work is presented in a
supplemental document to this paper [Storlie et al. (2014)] which is available
online. In that document a novel clustering method based on a probabilistic
change similarity measure is described. When a new malware instance is de-
tected, it can be clustered into a homogeneous group, where perhaps some of
the group members have already been reverse engineered by an analyst. The
analyst can then use these previous efforts to more quickly understand the
nature and functionality, origin, etc. of the newly suspected malicious pro-
gram. An example of how this would work on a particular malware instance
is also provided.
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6. Conclusions and further work. The Relaxed Adaptive Elastic Net is a
good framework for adding flexibility with splines for classification in high-
dimensional settings. It avoids over-fitting to obtain superior accuracy rel-
ative to other popular approaches for classifying new programs. It is also
possible to use a model-based classification approach that treats the dy-
namic trace as a Markov chain directly, and assumes a mixture of Dirichlet
distributions for the rows of the transition matrix P. This framework would
also cluster malware samples as it detects them. Also, Anderson et al. (2012)
use other features (e.g., static trace, file entropy, system calls) in addition to
dynamic traces (obtained via Pin) to perform classification. The approach
discussed here would easily allow for these additional features along with
the dynamic traces. Since categorization of instructions is useful, it seems
prudent to further investigate what the best possible categorization might
be.
The current framework allows for online application in a sandbox at the
perimeter of a network. Implementation of the classification procedure in
this manner is currently up and running on LANL’s network and has iden-
tified several instances of malware that were not found by any of LANL’s
commercial AV tools. Thus, this approach has proven to be a useful supple-
ment to traditional signature-based AV. The classification procedure runs
very quickly on a given trace (once the model is estimated, which is done of-
fline). The largest obstacle to producing a host-based software (i.e., running
the classification procedure on an actual user’s machine as it runs the appli-
cations) is the collection of dynamic traces in real time efficiently without
disruption to the user. The feasibility of such a collection procedure is cur-
rently being investigated. Finally, it could be useful to incorporate change
point detection in order to allow for instances where a benign process is
“hijacked” by a malicious program [Cova, Kruegel and Vigna (2010)].
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplement to “Stochastic identification and clustering of malware with
dynamic traces” (DOI: 10.1214/13-AOAS703SUPP; .pdf). This article also
has a supplemental document Storlie et al. (2014) available online which
presents preliminary work on the clustering of malware, to aid in reverse
engineering. Some computational complexity considerations for the proposed
method are also discussed.
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